"ought"-sentences without loss in some human contexts. ("Ought" and "should" and "obliged" and "must" seem to be the really synonymous pairs. The relation between the two pairs, I would say, is that "obligation" sentences codify some "rules of thumb" for how people should or ought to behave.) The point is just that "human-oriented" "ought"-sentences do not exhaust the range of "ought"-sentences. The sentences, "If you pull out the choke, your car ought to start" and "If the bookcase is only four feet wide, it should fit on the truck" are perfectly good English. Such examples, where the "obligatory" and "must" substitutions would lead, at best, to falsehood, provide good reasons for separating the investigation of "ought"-sentences from such fields as the logic of imperatives, deontic logic, and other such investigations of obligation-systems. 2 The proof that such an identification need not be made (and, by the way, that a unified theory of "ought"-sentences is possible) is in the working-out of the alternative accounts sketched in the final section of this paper.
Truth-preserving paraphrases and definitions require truths to be preserved. One of the expository simplifications with the logical "ought" is that there are an infinity of relatively uncontroversial truths using this "ought". If "A" is a theorem of pure first-order predicate calculus, then instances of the form "X ought to believe that A" are true. If "A" is a logical consequence of "B", then substitution instances of the schema "If X believes that B, then X ought to believe that A" are true, unless "not A" is also a logical consequence of "B".
A confusion of "ought" with "ought, all things considered" and "oughts" which imply responsibility may render some of the above instances counter-intuitive. In the case of two-year-old children who can't be expected to be very rational, there is a sense, analogous to what I call the "automotive" "ought", in which it is false that they ought to believe a long logical truth. A way of reading "X ought to believe that A", at least until the theory below which clarifies the various "senses" of "ought" is presented, is as "It is reasonable for X to believe that A". The reason we don't fault children for "violations" of the logical "ought " is that it's unreasonable to expect them to be very reasonable. Similarly for the rest of us in the case of very long theorems, it's reasonable for us to believe them, but we are not to be expected to be perfectly reasonable.
II. THE LOGICAL FORM OF SENTENCES USING "OUGHT"
In this semantical section of the paper, I argue that [8] , where it is claimed that all "conditionals" are two-place predicates of sentences.) What I need to make plausible is that sentences expressing "hypothetical oughts" and sentences expressing "conditional probabilities" have parallel logical forms and parallel logical features. It's not too important that the common logical form be the one I suggest.
The argument below first shows that "if . . . then . . . ought . . ."-sentences do not "detach" and that they create referentially opaque contexts throughout the whole surface conditional. These features won't be, strictly speaking, established, since their assignment to "ought"-sentences accounts for phenomena that various special devices have typically been used to account for. My account will be established only insofar as it yields a simpler theory. With regard to familiar alternative theories, I should say briefly that the major conflict between their theories and mine is specialization in "ought"-sentences that are plausibly treated as "obligation" sentences. -."sentences are unified sentence-containing contexts, the surface "antecedent" of the sentence must be shown to be referentially opaque as well as the surface "consequent". Then, since the peculiar non-detaching referentially opaque "conditional" only seems to arise with "if . . . then . . . ought . . and "if . . . then . . . probably . . .9"-sentences, the "conditional" can plausibly be treated as a pair of two-place sentenceor proposition-operators rather than as a special conditional which only hag "oughts" and "probablys" in the consequent. To argue for the opacity in "ought"-sentences, I produce two examples, one "automotive", the other "logical".
"If you pull out the choke on Jones's car, it ought to start" is true, since it is an instance of the true generalized sentence, "If you pull out the choke on a car, it ought to start". The choke on Jones's car is in fact the third knob to the right on the only flooded Ford in Jarvis, New Jersey. But the sentence, "If you pull out the third knob to the right on the only flooded Ford in Jarvis, New Jersey, then it ought to start" is false, since nothing will make a flooded car start but letting it sit a while. The consequences an event ought to have seem to depend on how the event is described. More accurately, "oughtconsequences" are associated with aspects of events or with events-under-a-description, not with events themselves.
"If Jones believes that all animals are dangerous and that Fred the frog is a pet animal, he ought to believe that Fred the frog is dangerous" is true, since a person ought to believe the logical consequences of what he believes. Jones, though, is the one person who believes that pets are not dangerous. It is not true that if the one person who believes that pets are not dangerous believes that all animals are dangerous and that Fred the frog is a pet animal, then he ought to believe that Fred the frog is dangerous. Relative to this "antecedent", it's not the case either that such a person ought to believe that Fred is dangerous or that he ought to believe that Fred is dangerous. When both a sentence and its negation are logical consequences of a belief, neither ought to be believed.
The above example cannot be totally convincing because the theorist has a choice of principles to give up. He can decide that "ought"-sentences are transparent but that instances of true generalized "ought"-sentences are not true. A theorist can also decide that, since the instance is false in the case of Jones's car, the generalized "ought"-sentence is also false, thus again preserving transparency. The second course would leave us with no true generalized "ought"-sentences. Analogous remarks hold of "proofs" of referential opacity in any construction. "Referential opacity", in effect, amounts in this case to a new label for the phenomenon of moral conflict, though it is generalized somewhat. That assignment of opacity is the choice to make to account for the above sentences can only be borne out by the rest of the theory.
Persuasive examples with the "logical" "ought" are somewhat hard to construct, since the only uncontroversial singular terms refer to believers. Also, given the above-mentioned A factor which discourages acceptance of the above results is the identification of "ought" in some cases with the corresponding "it is obligatory that" construction. "It is obligatory that" seems to create contexts which are transparent. Further, conditionals with such contexts seem to "detach" in much the same way that "it is necessary that" consequents detach. I claim that the general identification of "ought"-sentences and "it is obligatory that"-sentences is a mistake. "Ought"-sentences are formally like sentences of conditional probability, whereas "it is obligatory that"-sentences are analogous to "it is necessary that"-sentences. It is only in rather special cases that "ought"-sentences and "it is obligatory that"-sentences coincide in truthvalue. Because of this, there is no argument here with theories of obligation or logic.
If "if . . . then . . . ought . . ."-sentences consist of a single operator which ranges over the entire apparent conditional and governs the content of both the surface "antecedent" and the surface "consequent", then there are two tactics a theorist can adopt in dealing with "categorical" "ought"-sentences. Either he can treat the "oughts" as homonyms, or he can find ways of building in concealed or understood "if"-clauses. These "if"-clauses will turn out to be understood first arguments of two-place predicates, much analogous to the "for a man" second argument that is filled in in understanding "Jones is tall". I choose the latter, theoretically preferable, tactic.
Given the opacity, the unity, and the non-detachability of 
III. PRINCIPLES OF BELIEF
If the above or something equally unilluminating gives the logical form of sentences using "ought", then knowing the logical form of such sentences isn't going to be of much use in finding out when the two-place "0" predicate is true of a pair of sentences. To develop the part of the theory I need for the "logical" "ought", I state some principles of belief, interpreted both as principles of agent-interpretation and as a priori truths about believers.
The The above principles about belief are stated in terms of conditional probability. That is, if rA' is a short logical truth, then given that B is a believer, B probably believes that A. Relative to a conjunction of "B is a believer" with further information, e.g., that B's guru says that FA1 is false, it may be improbable that B believes that A. I should further point out that these principles are vastly weaker than the principles which generate the infinity of logical "ought"-structures. The next section's task is to generate those principles out of these. The standard formal theory of conditional probability with which my theory begins, treats "pr" as a two-place function of some kind of entity as arguments and a number as value. The form of "The probability that the car will start, given that you pulled out the choke is 0. There is no sharp boundary between cases where "P(S,S')" is true and "not-(P(SS'))" is true in terms of pr-values, just as there is no sharp boundary between pr-numbers which are large and ones which are not large for pr-numbers. The fundamental theory of believers built into common sense and codified by Quine could now be stated as quantified "P"-sentences. As I have written them below, the quantifications are, strictly speaking, nonsense, since variables range over both things and expressions. This flaw can be repaired at great cost in legibility with a concatenation function (C) and by the use of a denotation relation (Den) which relates words and what they name. For example, "(x) (x assents to rx is here')" becomes, in a conscientious notation, "(x) (Ey) (Den(y) = x & x assents to C(y, "is here"))". For the sake of legibility, I have stuck to sloppy quantification:
(1 b) (x)(S)(S is a short contradiction only if P(Fx is a believer 1, F x doesn't believe S 1 ) ).
(2b) (x) (S) (S') (S' is inconsistent with S only if P( x believes S ,1 r x doesn't believe S 1 ) ). (3b) (x)(S)(S is a short logical truth only if P(Fx is a believer1 , r x believes S')). (4b) (x) (S) (S') (S") (S is the conditional r S' only if S" ' only if P( F x believes S & x believes S' 1, F x believes S" )).
(5b) (x) (S) (S' ) (S is a logical truth & S' is not much different in length from S & S' is a stubstitution-instance of S only if P( rx believes S1, rx believes S" ) ).
IV. THE LOGICAL "OUGHT"
As a preliminary to giving a definition of "ought", I describe in rough terms the relation between rational agents (which we all are) and perfect rational agents (believers who believe a complete set of axioms and believe logical consequences of what they believe). A logically perfect believer is a believer who, in every step of a chain of changing beliefs, believes what any believer would probably believe, if he had arrived at the previous point in a chain of changing beliefs. For the perfect believer (structurally speaking), the "P" principles which characterize all believers can be replaced by universally quantified conditionals (or "is large" can be replaced by "= 1"). A person who always believed in accordance with the constraints maximization of which we impose on the interpretation of others would believe all logical truths and all logical consequences of what he believed.
To see this, consider a very long theorem of the first-order functional calculus. By the Godel completeness theorem, there is a proof of the theorem. Consider a proof of that theorem, in which each step is either an axiom or derived from an earlier step by modus ponens or by application of a substitution rule. By principle (3), a perfect believer believes all the short axioms of the first-order functional calculus, since for any believer and any short logical truth, that believer probably believes that logical truth. If the transition from one step of the proof to the next is by modus ponens, principle (4) says that the perfect believer will believe the succeeding step, since any person who believed all previous steps (which the perfect believer does) would probably believe the next. If the transition is by the application of the substitution rule, then there is a series of applications of the substitution rule such that the result of each successive application of the rule is near enough in length to the previous result that principle (5) applies and such that it ends with the succeeding step in the original proof. In this series of intermediate steps, the perfect believer will believe every step, since any believer who believed all previous steps would probably believe the succeeding step. Since every proof can be thus broken down into steps such that anyone who believed the contents of all previous steps would probably believe the next, the perfect believer-the person who, structurally speaking, always believes what everyone would probably believe given his beliefs-believes all theorems and, therefore, by conditionalization and modus ponens, all logical consequences of his beliefs. With any very long proof, it will be very improbable that any actual rational agent will get through the whole proof, i.e., end up believing the theorem, even though, if he had gotten to any particular point in the proof (i.e., if he believed everything in the proof so far), he would probably have gotten to the next step. We would expect habitual failure to believe long theorems and distant logical consequences of beliefs in actual cases because of the principle of multiplication of probabilities. When there is a chain of contents of beliefs such that anyone probably holds the beginning belief and anyone who held all the previous beliefs in the chain would probably hold the next, it is true that anyone ought to believe that last element of the chain, given that he is a believer.
In showing the relation between the person who believes what he ought to believe, in the "logical" sense, and real believers, I need to make the above sketch precise by giving a definition of "O" in terms of "P". To be completely general and not restricted just to "logical" "oughts", the definition must be more complicated than it strictly needs to be to accomodate just the logical case. The logical case is easier because it is much more obvious that the definition is truth-preserving. When the definition has been stated and explained, I will indicate how other ''senses' of "ought" can be generated by changing the first argument of the "O" relation, given that the appropriate extensions and strengthenings of the theory of agent-interpretation can be justified. The chain will start with some substitution instance of the conjunct, "P("Jones is a believer", "Jones believes that X")", where X is some sentence that a person probably believes, given that he is a believer. Any short logical truth, for instance, + r) ))".) Both of these conjuncts have second arguments which are immediate "P"-consequences of "Jones is a believer", by the principle that if a sentence is a short logical truth, any believer probably believes it. The first argument of the second conjunct is a conjunction because of clause (e). The application of clauses (a), (b), and (c), so far should be obvious.
(a) ((S is a conjunction) & (b) (y) (y is a conjunct in S only if y has the form P (C,D)) & (c) the first argument in the first conjunct of S is A & (d) the second argument in the last conjunct of S is B & (e) (y) (y is a conjunct of S only if the first argument of y is the conjunction of the previous arguments occurring in previous conjuncts of S and A) & (f) (C) ((L(C) is less than 11,562 times L(A) & P(A, C)) only if C occurs as an argument in a conjunct if it can before any D such that not-(P(A,D)) occurs in S) & (g) not-(PC(A, not-B)) & (h) S is true) or "O(A,B)" is an instance of a true generalized "O"-

"Fred floats and doesn't float only if grass grows" ("((p & -p) q)"), would give us a truth if inserted for X. The second conjunct might be "P("Jones is a believer and Jones believes that ((p & -p)-q)", "Jones believes that if Fred floats and grass grows only if rabbits run, then if Fred floats only if grass grows, then Fred floats only if rabbits run")". ("(((p & q) --r) -* ((pq) -(p -
Because of clause (f), the next several million conjuncts will have second arguments which are short logical truths. Clause (f) requires that every direct "P"-consequence of "Jones is a believer" that can be built into the chain be built into the chain. Since previous second arguments of conjuncts in the chain are now conjuncts in the first argument of every succeeding conjunct, it should be obvious that not every direct "P"-consequence will be built in, given a way of starting the chain. Some things are probable given A which are not probable given A & B & C & D & E, even though each of B, C, D, and E are probable relative to A. The idea here is to get a "complete content" of "Jones is a believer", as will be explained in the particular account of clause (f), below. The "11,562" section of the clause is an arbitrary device to capture a full content of "Jones is a believer" without requiring the chain to run on forever.
So far, then, we have "P("Jones is a believer", "Jones believes This clause is also designed to avoid sidetracks which would lead to counterexamples and to make the outcomes of chains more determinate, given an argument A. What it says roughly is that as many of the really different parts of the "content" of the first argument as possible, given a way of starting to draw consequences, must be in the chain before any indirect "P"-consequences of A, (that is, "P"-consequences of "P"-consequences of A which are not "P"-consequences of A) are drawn. In general, given a way of starting to draw "P"-consequences, not every direct "P"-consequence of A can go in a chain.
That is, if we have already built in the direct consequences C and D, then the only way we can build in E is if P(A & C & D,E). But "P(A,E)" is compatible with "not-(P(A & C
& D, E))". Thus, this clause allows as "P"-consequences of the continuing chain only ones which are also "P"-consequences of A, until we run out of direct "P"-consequences of A which are also "P"-consequences of the continuing chain. The restriction on available C's that they be less than 11,652 times as long as A sets an arbitrary upper bound within which all really different parts of the content of A can be stated. The idea of this restriction is that any direct "P"-consequence of A which cannot be stated in any sentence less than 11,652 times the length of A is going to come to roughly the same thing as some sentence which is also a direct "P"-consequence of A and which is less than 11,652 times the length of A.
There is still some freedom in constructing chains, because it matters what direct "P"-consequence of A the chain starts with and what the next one is, etc., since some ways of starting will allow a direct consequence of A, say C12, where other ways won't, if C12 isn't a "P"-consequence of the conjunction of A and the "P"-consequences with which the chain started. Thus, a sentence like "If Jones believes A, he ought to believe B" is several ways ambiguous, though many of these ways are pragmatically, not syntactically or semantically, differentiated. Much long explanation could be given of how we are able to "tell what someone means" by one of these sentences in a context but won't be here.
VI. OTHER FIRST ARGUMENTS FOR "O"-SENTENCES
A claim of this paper is that the above definition of the "O"-predicate gives the truth-conditions of every sentence using "ought" in English. I can't demonstrate this in a paper of this length, but I can say roughly how it is done and what other a priori principles of person-interpretation there have to be for the definition to be truth-preserving for cases other than the logical "ought".
The differences among the "rule of thumb", logical, epistemic, prudential, and moral "oughts" are differences in their first arguments and differences in the kind of "P"-principles, i.e., constraints on person-interpretation, that their justifications appeal to.
The first arguments of logical "oughts" are belief-sentences, as we have seen, and the second argument is also a belief-sen-tence. The relevant "P"-principles for the logical "ought" are all structural principles which say what the interrelations among elements of a system of beliefs must be.
The first arguments of epistemic "oughts" are either ascriptions of knowledge or belief or sentences about the location and circumstances and history of the agent; e.g., "If he's been to Ohio, he ought to know where Granville is."
In the case of both prudential "oughts", the first argument includes a want-sentence, i.e., either something like "Jones wants a peach" or "Jones is a wanter" ("(ES) (Jones wants-true S)").
The first argument of a moral "ought"-sentence is an ascription of agenthood or personhood; e.g., "Jones is a person." In the moral case, that is, no special content about the particular interests or beliefs occurs in the first argument, so that nothing but "P"-consequences of Jones being a person qua person can start the chain.
Both moral and prudential "ought"-sentences typically have intentional action sentences as second argument. Intentional action sentences I take to be analyzed as the propositional attitude "makes-true", so that "Jones bites his sister" has the form "(E S) (Jones makes-true S & S means that Jones bites his sister)". Roughly, "makes-true" or "does" in the intentional sense is to "wants" as "knows-true" or "knows" is to "believes". Both knowing and doing have both external and internal truth conditions in that truth, plus possibly some causal chain, is required in addition to the agent being in a propositional state. "Rule of thumb" "ought"-sentences are in a way the most general case of "ought"-sentences. One way of phrasing my general claim about intentional systems and their application is that our predictive theories about agents framed in terms of beliefs, desires, and actions are mere "rule of thumb" theories at best and essentially unrefinable to anything predictively much better.6 Wherever there is a "rule of thumb" body of knowledge, applications of that body of knowledge are often in the form of "ought"-sentences. From basically statistical principles about cars, we know that if you pull out the choke, the car ought to start. It is not hard to see how these "ought"-sentences work and how our definition is truth-preserving for these cases, if we allow that pragmatic grounds can stop us from saying automotive "ought"-sentences which are made true by very long conjunctions. Just about any first argument can occur in the "rule of thumb" "ought"-sentence, since so much of our knowledge of the world is "statistical". What function analogously to belief-constraints in these cases are just generalized probabilistic, "ceteris paribus" true beliefs.
For the intentional system "ought"-sentences, the ones which interest us, the argument that my definition is truth-preserving must take two stages. I first have to show that there are true "P" -principles about wanting and being a person, and then I have to show that these principles are adequate to generate all and only the right "P"-chains. I will sketch briefly the first stage. The cases I will deal with are the epistemic, "structural"-prudential, and moral "ought"-sentences. What I will be limited to doing is saying what kind of constraints on agent-interpretations have to be shown to be rational to show that my definition applied to these types of "ought"-sentences come out true when and only when they do.
Truths with the epistemic "ought" are truths about what a person ought to believe which are made true by "P"-principles other than (1 a)-(5a) and which have a belief-sentence or a situation-sentence as first argument. Constraints on agent-interpretation which are relevant to the epistemic "ought" will be constraints or truths about knowledge and belief, at least. As an example of such a constraint, there is Quine's dictum ([6], Ch. 2) that people usually have to hold correct beliefs (have knowledge) about what's happening in stimulus situations, but not much else. When a complete set of such constraints are found, they will amount to a codification of basic perceptiontheory and inductive logic. The "P"-principles required for the truth of epistemic "ought"-sentences will be internal structural principles as well as at least situation or truth-principles (e.g., "(x) (P("x is a believer & x is in front of a cow", "x knows he is in front of a cow"))").
By the "structural"-prudential "ought" I have in mind "O"-sentences that follow from basic decision theory. The first arguments of such "ought"-sentences consist of a conjunction of a set of want-sentences and a set of belief-sentences. Decisiontheory will say what is a rational desire relative to those wants and beliefs. Several people have argued that decision-theoretic consistency and rationality is imposed on agent-interpretation in roughly the way that first-order logical consistency and rationality is. In this case, like the case with the logical "ought", we know what the constraints should be like, since decision theory is already codified. All that needs to be done to find basic truths about wanters is to take the axioms and rules of the calculus of probabilities and convert them to "P"-sentences. The truth of "structural"-prudential "ought"-sentences depends entirely on structural principles about desires.
The prudential "ought" differs from the "structural"-prudential "ought" in that, in this case, the first argument consists of want-sentences alone, either the ascription of a particular want or set of wants to a person or the statement that the entity in question is a wanter (i.e., "(ES) (Jones wantstrue S)"). The knowledge that is required to yield a rational action relative to the person's wants will be knowledge that anyone probably has, given that he has those wants. In order to get truth-preservation for real prudential "ought"-sentences, all relevant knowledge has to come into the "P"-chain as something any person with those wants ought to know. Basically, this means that constraints on agent-interpretation have to be strong enough to enable us to form a "P"-chain starting just with the sentence that a thing has a particular set of wants and ending with any truth. Thus, in addition to structural constraints on wants, prudential "ought"-sentences require for their truth very strong content-constraints on assignment of beliefs and knowledge.
The question whether the above definition is truth-preserving in the case of the prudential "ought" turns out to be the question of whether there is a truth-constraint among the epistemic constraints. Davidson, in arguing that seeking agreement with another person is a rational procedure in translation ( [2] ), is basically claiming that it is rational in agent-interpretation to make as many of the beliefs of the other true as possible, and thus claiming that most of the beliefs of anything translatable are true. If he is correct, then for any truth S, (x)(P("x is a believer & S is true", "x believes S")). To avoid the somewhat counterintuitive sound of this principle, it's worth remembering that it doesn't imply that (x) (P("x is a believer & S is a newly discovered truth of quantum mechanics", "x believes S")). The generalized principle is a conditional probability claim relative just to S being a truth and x being a believer. Since what is needed for the prudential "ought" are truths to apply the person's given wants to, the only way I can see to get the prudential "ought" is by an agreement-constraint (which is a "truth-to-the-best-of-our-knowledge" constraint) or some other constraint which will have the effect of being a truth-constraint. An agreement-constraint or a truth-constraint (of which Quine's stimulus-situation correctness constraint used for the epistemic "ought" is a weak example) is a departure from logical and decision-theoretic constraints in that it is a content constraint rather than a structural constraint. I should make this distinction explicitly. Structural constraints codify knowledge to the effect that any agent's system of wants and beliefs must have certain internal inter-relationships and constrain agent-interpretation in accordance with this knowledge. Content constraints codify knowledge about what any agent probably believes and probably wants, and constrain agent-interpretation so that most such wants and beliefs are imposed on others. Content-constraints, roughly, rule out the possibility of their being agents with structurally sound but very stupid systems of wants and beliefs.
In the case of the moral "ought", there have to be contentconstraints on both wants and beliefs for my definition to be truth-preserving. Moral "ought"-sentences take nothing but personhood as a starting point and thus must have want-content principles in order that "P"-chains end up with actions. ("Hypothetical" moral "ought"-sentences are genuine conditionals. Moral "ought"-sentences about what Jones ought to do given his particular situation depend on being able to build truths, particularly truths about Jones, into the "P"-chains by means of the belief content-constraints. The moral "It ought to be the case that . . ." has the form "(x)(O("x is a person", "x wants that . .."))", i.e., anyone ought to want that. . ..) The perfect rational agent, morally speaking, has the correct basic wants and true beliefs and calculates correctly. I have already indicated how truths can be introduced into "P"-chains by agreement-constraints; the case of correct basic wants is similar, given that the notion of a basic want, or a want which is not derived from beliefs, can be made clear. Roughly, there has to be a basic-want agreement constraint, so that any desire that is a basic desire of mine is, to the best of my knowledge, probably shared by any other. This will yield "What a person, in my opinion, ought to do." To get what a person really ought to do, morally speaking, we need to find truths of the form "(x) (P(" x is a person", " x wants A") )".
That it is rational to apply some such constraints in agent-interpretation can be seen from the following kind of example: A person drops a rock on his toe and suffers great pain. An explanation which we know to be wrong, even though it is structurally sound and involves no false beliefs, is that the person wanted pain and thought that dropping a rock on his toe would be a good way to get it. That is, we know the following about agents: they probably don't want pain. Which moral "ought"-sentences are true depends on what is true and what content-constraints there are on wants. In the case of the moral "ought", there are, unfortunately, fewer undisputed truths to be preserved by definition. A correct theory of "ought"-sentences will, I hope, be confirmed by sentences with first arguments other than "is a person", and will then be applied to help us discover what the true moral "ought"-sentences are. 7 
